Not optimal, but Effective: the Multi-Mode Ticket for Reducing Urban Traffic







Economists have long been aware of congestion ex-
ternalities and proposed very sophisticated road
pricing schemes to internalize the external costs of
driving in urban regions. An optimal solution could
be achieved by levying road user fees that exactly
equal the additional costs that each car driver im-
poses on others. Since these costs depend among
many other things, on location, time and type of car,
an optimal policy requires, in principle, individual,
time-dependent and locally differentiated road user
charges (see Lindsey and Verhoef 2000 for a recent
survey). Apart from Singapore, where such a differ-
entiating scheme has been introduced and some far-
reaching plans for Hong Kong that have been
shelved yet again, not much further action has been
observed.
Pragmatic second-best solutions such as cordon fee
systems are more promising. Since London intro-
duced its cordon toll system in the spring of 2003,
many local administrations have renewed their in-
terest in such road pricing schemes and are eagerly
studying the first results. Nevertheless, such low-cost
and easy-to-implement solutions are not very popu-
lar among scientists.Engineers promote the most so-
phisticated technology available, which normally re-
quires huge set-up investments. The German high-
way toll system is a good example in this respect.
Economists often do not dare to propose simple
rule-of-thumb policies, which, although they may
reap huge welfare gains, fail to meet the profession-
al standard of providing optimal or almost ideal so-
lutions to current economic problems.
This article introduces the idea of the “multi-mode
ticket” that is described in more detail in the book
Alleviating Urban Traffic Congestion (Arnott,Rave
and Schöb 2005). The multi-mode ticket may be at-
tractive for small and medium-sized towns that often
face severe traffic jam problems and are interested
in low-cost solutions. In the late 1980s, it was the
Stockholm Urban Traffic Committee that came up
with the idea of what we call the multi-mode ticket:
each driver entering the inner city by car on work-
days between 6.00 a.m. and 6.00 p.m. should provide
a valid ticket for the Stockholm public transporta-
tion system.This could be a monthly ticket for com-
muters or a single return ticket for occasional travel-
ers.When paying this “entrance fee”, each car driver
would receive a vignette that had to be put on the
windshield for easy monitoring by traffic wardens in
the inner city zone. Expectations were that this
would reduce peak-period time traffic by 13 percent
and total traffic by 9 percent and that the additional
revenues would outweigh the administration costs
by a quintuple. Although in the end it was not im-
plemented the idea spread and for some time gained
political and public appeal beyond Sweden. In Ger-
many, the Green party suggested this scheme for
medium-sized towns above 100,000 inhabitants. Since
the implementation in both Sweden and Germany
would have required a change in federal law, howev-
er, the idea completely disappeared from the politi-
cal agenda.Apparently, modesty in political consult-
ing became outdated and so did the Stockholm pro-
posal.This was a pity,not only for Stockholm but for
many other towns as well. Stockholm could have al-
leviated traffic congestion substantially for the last
15 years. Instead it is still waiting for more sophisti-
cated road pricing systems.
The economic incentive structure of the multi-mode
ticket is very simple and appealing for at least two
reasons. First, even though the multi-mode ticket
might not increase the marginal costs for a car trip
downtown, it would reduce the opportunity costs of
traveling downtown by bus or train thus inducing sub-
stitution of public transportation for private trans-
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portation. Second, since the policy replaces a ticket
paid only by bus passengers with a ticket paid by all
those entering the inner city by bus or car, revenues
would go up dramatically. This would allow the local
authorities to both reduce the deficit and increase the
capacity of the public transportation system, which in
turn would increase the public support for the scheme.
After a brief review of the external cost of urban
traffic congestion, we will analyze the economic in-
centive structure of the multi-mode ticket in more
detail and discuss ways to implement such a low-cost
solution in medium-sized towns that suffer from se-
vere traffic congestion.
Road congestion externalities1
There are several different externalities of urban
traffic congestion. First, there are time-related mar-
ginal external congestion costs.Every car driver on a
congested urban road imposes a cost on all other dri-
vers by slowing them down. For a given road capaci-
ty, up to a certain traffic density speed is unaffected
when one additional driver enters the road. But
when a critical level is reached, each additional dri-
ver reduces the average speed and increases the
travel time for all other drivers. Estimates show that
the time-related marginal external congestion costs
are on average between US$4 and US$6.Apart from
time-related externalities,road congestion is respon-
sible for several other externalities.
• Congestion also affects the probability and severi-
ty of traffic accidents.External costs arise if the to-
tal accident costs rise more than proportionately
with respect to the traffic flow. Earlier studies
pointed in this direction (Vickrey 1968; Newbery
1988), but some more recent studies have found
that average accident costs (not including delay
costs) may actually fall with traffic flow indicating
a marginal external benefit of congestion (cf. Frid-
strøm and Ingebrigsten 1991; Zho and Sisiopiku
1997). Speeding up traffic will reduce the frequen-
cy with which accidents occur,but at the same time
will increase the severity of accidents. In heavy
traffic, people drive more slowly and accidents
cause fewer casualties.
• Congestion also leads to extra fuel consumption.
The running costs on urban arterials are about 
40 percent higher than on highways and rise quick-
ly when congestion reduces speed to below 20 miles
per hour on an urban arterial (Small 1992, p. 76).
Thus, a car driver imposes not only time costs on
other car drivers but also extra fuel costs.
• Closely related to additional fuel consumption is
congestion-related pollution. Even though pollu-
tion depends in a very complex way on both the
number of cars and the average speed on a con-
gested road so that it is very difficult to find a sig-
nificant statistical relationship (cf. Small and
Gómez-Ibáñez 1999), pollution costs (including
costs from noise) are normally assumed to in-
crease with traffic flow. Small and Kazimi (1995)
estimated that the total costs of pollution add up
to 3.3 cents per mile in the Los Angeles metro-
politan area.
• Finally,it should be noted that congestion fees can
reap an additional second dividend that arises
when tax revenues from congestion are used to
cut other taxes that cause a deadweight loss.Given
the huge inefficiency of the existing tax systems,
the prospective welfare gains from using conges-
tion fee revenues to reduce the welfare costs of
taxation can be significant.Parry and Bento argue
that “there is drastically more at stake in terms of
economic welfare in what the government does
with the congestion tax revenues than the entire
welfare gains from internalizing the congestion
externality” (Parry and Bento 2001, p. 662). Their
simulations for linear demand and marginal cost
curves indicate that the second dividend from re-
ducing other distorting taxes is almost four times
as high as the welfare gains from reducing conges-
tion externalities.
By using the time-related marginal external conges-
tion cost of US$4 to US$6 as a lower bound for the
total marginal external cost,we can compare the cost
of car commuting with the cost of commuting by bus.
A survey of operating costs and the deficits of the
public transportation authorities of some selected
medium-sized towns in Europe and North America
shows that all public transportation systems run a
deficit that is normally covered by the municipality.
Thus,municipalities have a genuine interest in raising
additional revenues to cover these costs. The opera-
tion costs calculated per round trip are in the range
of 100 to 160 percent of the price of a daily round-trip
ticket which are in the range of US$2 to US$4 in most
medium-sized towns. Since these average operating
costs give us an upper bound for the marginal costs of
bus commuting,this is also the range for the maximum
marginal costs of a round trip not yet borne by the
1 More detailed surveys can be found in Small (1992,pp.78-85) and
Small and Gómez-Ibáñez (1999).passenger. Hence, some substitution of bus commut-
ing for car commuting promises to improve welfare.
The theory of the multi-mode ticket
We focus our analysis on work-related traffic con-
gestion. Workers who live in the suburbs and work
downtown are free to choose whether to commute
on a congested road or to take the bus.The number
of trips by car is denoted by a (for automobile), the
number of bus trips are denoted by b (for bus).
Commuting is time consuming, but the time spent
in the car or the bus may be more or less valuable
for commuters, i.e. commuters consider the two
modes as imperfect substitutes. Commuters can ei-
ther buy daily tickets or a monthly ticket.The price
of a daily bus ticket is given by τ b. If someone de-
cides to buy a monthly ticket, the price for daily
tickets becomes zero.
The worker’s decision problem
The marginal time costs of the individual commuter
equal the average commuting time costs APC(a) for
all commuters.For car drivers,it is APC(a),whereby
we define these costs exclusive of any road user
charges.Each commuter takes this time as given,but
the average commuting time is rising with the total
number of commuters. The individual commuting
costs exclusive of the bus ticket are defined accord-
ingly as APC(b).
In Figure 1,the horizontal distance between the ver-
tical axes measures the total number of commuting
trips.The number of bus trips is measured from left
to right and the number of car trips is measured
from right to left.Average costs per bus trip are ris-
ing since commuters prefer some variety and find it
increasingly boring to permanently commute by
bus. For car trips, the curve is increasing because
congestion increases the average commuting time.
Without any regulation, commuters will split trans-
portation modes such that their cost of traveling by
car, APC(a), equal their individual cost of commut-
ing by bus, APC(b) + τ b. Hence, without any road
pricing we observe an equilibrium with a0 bus trips
and 1 – a0 car trips.
The multi-mode ticket and the day-by-day decision
If every commuter who drives downtown has to buy
a daily ticket for the price of τb that allows him to
travel either by car or by bus, the multi-mode ticket
works like a congestion fee: it increases the price of
commuting by car relative to the price of going by
bus.Starting in the original equilibrium a0 Figure 1,a
commuter who – at the margin – decided to take the
car before the multi-mode ticket was introduced,
now faces higher car commuting costs and switches
from car to bus.An additional a1 – a0 trip will now be
made by bus rather than by car. Without the multi-
mode ticket, the bus fare distorts the decision in fa-
vor of car commuting. This distortion is now elimi-
nated irrespectively of the price of the multi-mode
ticket. The multi-mode ticket thus unambiguously
determines the allocation of a given number of com-
muting trips. Note however, that the introduction of
the multi-mode ticket increases commuting cost,
which in return may affect the total number of com-
muting trips.2
The marginal social cost of commuting by car is de-
noted by MSC(a), the difference between MSC(a)
and APC(a) indicates the marginal external costs of
car commuting. In Figure 1, the trapezoid shaded in
light gray then indicates the wel-
fare gain from reduced traffic
congestion that can be reaped
when the multi-mode ticket is in-
troduced. Thereby we consider
the reasonable case we discussed
in the last section that the mar-
ginal external congestion costs
exceed the bus ticket price τ  b.
The triangle in black indicates the
remaining welfare loss with a* be-
ing the optimal allocation. As
long as the bus ticket price is low-
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er than the marginal external costs, the multi-mode
ticket fails to reach the optimal allocation, but the
welfare effect of introducing the multi-mode ticket is
unambiguously positive.
So far, we implicitly assumed that the bus fare equals
the marginal cost of a bus trip.If the marginal costs of
bus commuting were negligible, the bus fare would
have to be considered as a pure mark-up.This would
not affect the two allocations a0 and a1, but would af-
fect the welfare analysis.This is shown in Figure 2.
The welfare gains become more significant when the
bus ticket is a pure mark up over marginal cost of bus
commuting.In this case,the APC(b) curve represents
the marginal social cost of bus commuting. (In Fig-
ure 1, by contrast, it is the APC(b) + τ b curve which
represents the marginal social costs of bus commut-
ing.) In the initial equilibrium a0, the allocation is the
same as before but the welfare gain from introducing
the multi-mode ticket increases by τ b(a1 – a0). The
area shaded in light gray in Figure 2 shows the wel-
fare gain. Figure 2 also shows that
the optimal allocation requires an
even larger shift towards commut-
ing by bus.In this case,the optimal
allocation is defined by a**.
The monthly multi-mode ticket 
What happens if commuters de-
cide to buy a monthly ticket rath-
er than buying tickets on a daily
basis? In contrast to the standard
road pricing schemes, the possibil-
ity of buying a monthly (or annu-
al) ticket does not affect the main
property of the multi-mode ticket,
namely the equivalence of the
ticket price for commuting by car
and bus. The monthly ticket does
not affect the price of commuting
by car. This remains at APC(a).
The costs for an additional trip by
bus, however, fall to APC(b) and
the new equilibrium is at APC(a1)
=  APC(b). We therefore obtain
the same condition for the optimal
modal choice of the worker as be-
fore: for a given number of com-
muting trips, the equilibrium allo-
cation for the monthly multi-mode
ticket is the same as for the daily
multi-mode ticket. Figure 3 shows both outcomes.
Compared to the daily ticket, however, commuting
costs are now lower by the amount of τ  bThis in-
creases the incentive to commute compared to the
case where only daily tickets are available. We may
therefore expect an increase in total work-related
trips, but workers will also substitute commuting by
bus for commuting by car so that it will remain un-
clear a priori whether congestion increases or falls.
The properties of the monthly multi-mode ticket are
very different from those of the cordon toll system in
London that allows road users to pass the cordon
when they have a monthly ticket.For a monthly tick-
et for passing the London cordon,the marginal costs
of a trip by car do not change, but compared to the
multi-mode ticket that allows for free bus trips as
well,the marginal costs of bus commuting are higher
by the bus fare τ b. In Figure 3, a0 indicates the cor-
don fee equilibrium for London for a given number
of commuting trips. Compared to such a scheme, the
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WITH A MONTHLY TICKET
Figure 3monthly multi-mode ticket changes the relative
prices for each trip decision. As monthly or annual
tickets alleviate the administration significantly,
without reducing the efficiency of the instrument,we
have identified another advantage: the multi-mode
ticket increases the price of car commuting relative
to the price of the public transportation ticket irre-
spective of whether it is paid per trip or introduced
as a periodical fee.
Two additional advantages of the multi-mode ticket
are worth mentioning. First, in contrast to any cordon
price scheme that does not change the price ratio be-
tween car trips and bus trips within the cordon, the
multi-mode ticket changes the relative prices for trips
within the cordon.To see this, we can reinterpret Fig-
ure 3 and consider the horizontal distance as the total
number of trips within a cordon.The London cordon-
fee equilibrium will be at a0,irrespectively of whether
the car driver paid a daily or monthly cordon fee.
Although a cordon price scheme reduces trips to the
center and through traffic, it does not reduce traffic
within the cordon.The multi-mode ticket,by contrast,
also creates an incentive to go by bus for another trip
when the commuter has already passed the cordon.
When car drivers have bought multi-mode tickets,
they can use the bus for free in the whole cordon area.
When deciding whether to undertake a trip within the
cordon, the opportunity costs are therefore APC(b)
rather than APC(b) + τ b.The equilibrium for the in-
ner-cordon mode allocation is at a1 in Figure 3.
The second advantage is less apparent.Although the
multi-mode ticket is not designed as a ticket that al-
lows for price discrimination between peak times
and off peak times, price discrimination may be
achieved through variations in the public transporta-
tion capacity between peak and off peak times. If a
bus runs every 10 minutes during peak time and on-
ly every 20 minutes during off peak times, the ex-
pected waiting time for the bus is 5 minutes lower
during peak time. Thus the opportunity costs are
lower in peak times than in off peak times.Of course,
crowded buses and the risk of not being able to en-
ter a crowded bus may work in the opposite direc-
tion. Another channel of price discrimination is of-
fered by the existing price system of many local
transportation agencies.They often offer special dis-
counts for daily and monthly tickets if the bus is not
used before 9.00 a.m. This price discrimination can
be applied to car commuters as well.To guarantee ef-
fective monitoring,however,car commuters may not
use this ticket before 10.00 a.m., otherwise cheating
by those entering the inner city shortly before 9.00
a.m. may be too high.
From theory to policy
We will complement the analysis of the multi-mode
ticket by briefly discussing how to implement a mul-
ti-mode ticket in practice.The first and most impor-
tant question is how to determine the boundaries of
the inner city. Initially, the cordon defined by the
public transportation authority might be used to de-
fine the cordon of the multi-mode ticket. While the
former is only defined by bus stops,the latter also re-
quires borders for roads.As many towns apply a ring
system for its public transportation system, one also
has to clarify which rings should be included in the
new scheme and which should not. Introducing a
multi-mode ticket may lead to a rethinking of the
public transportation cordon as it is important to in-
clude the most congested areas of the town. In this
respect, designing an optimal cordon faces the same
problems as designing an optimal cordon for any
other road pricing scheme (see, for example,
Newbery and Santos 2001).
Of particular interest when designing a cordon is the
possibility for commuters to use park-and-ride facil-
ities.The multi-mode ticket would certainly increase
the value of park-and-ride systems many towns have
installed or plan to build.For remote commuters,the
multi-mode ticket makes it more attractive to drive
to a park-and-ride facility where they can easily find
a parking slot and from where a quick transfer to the
center is ensured. These park-and-ride facilities will
generate further time savings as they reduce the
search for parking. As most park-and-ride schemes
are available at no or low cost, they also allow the
commuter to save the high parking fees downtown.
To the extent that local authorities plan to enlarge
existing park-and-ride facilities, they may earmark
some of the additional revenues from the multi-
mode ticket for this purpose.
The administration of the whole system can be based
on the existing structures regarding the sale of bus
tickets and the monitoring of parking in the center.
In addition, fuel stations outside the cordon should
be allowed to sell the multi-mode tickets. Com-
muters will learn quickly about the multi-mode tick-
et,but it might be a problem to provide all necessary
information about the multi-mode ticket to out-of-
towners.Here,a standardized symbol for “town with
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multi-mode ticket”should be put on guide posts that
are closer than, for example, 30 miles. This would
give the occasional commuter the opportunity to buy
a ticket in time.
Enforcement is easy with respect to commuter traf-
fic. Local traffic wardens who watch for illegal
parking can simply check whether all cars have a
valid sticker on the windshield. More problematic,
of course, is monitoring the through traffic, but oc-
casional controls at lights within the cordon and at
the cordon boundary, combined with high penalties
for not providing a valid ticket, will reduce the in-
centives for free through traffic. Acceptability of
these measures can be easily achieved with a toler-
ant policy in the initial phase where only pro forma
tickets are issued to inform traffic offenders about
the consequences non-adherence will have in the
future.
Finally, it should be mentioned that marketing is im-
portant to gain political support.The Norwegian expe-
rience of selling the policy of introducing a price for a
good that was free of charge before shows that the
public must be informed in time about the intended
introduction and its purposes. Information policy ap-
parently must not simply highlight the advantages of
reduced traffic congestion, it has to face people’s ex-
pectation to be charged for things they wish to acquire,
not for things they want to avoid (Jones 1998; Odeck
and Bråthen 2002). Ison (2000) points out that ear-
marking revenue for investments in public transporta-
tion may be important for the public opinion. Hence,
detailed ex ante plans on the improvement of park-
and-ride facilities, the increased frequency in peak
times and the modernization of the bus fleet may in-
crease public acceptance.
The multi-mode ticket will not fully internalize the
external costs of urban road congestion. Never-
theless,it offers towns with severe traffic problems a
low-cost, easy-to-implement policy that promises
significant welfare gains and is easy to administer
and monitor. It may not be the final step towards
more efficient urban transportation. A first modifi-
cation may be to allow for a cheaper “bus-only”
ticket alongside the multi-mode ticket. This allows
for more price flexibility with respect to congestion
pricing without changing the incentive structure. It
may also be a promising start for many towns that,
based on positive experiences with the multi-mode
ticket, are considering whether to implement more
sophisticated systems of road pricing.
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